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SECURITIES REGULATION: SECTION 16 (b) APPLIED
TO ONE OF TWO POSSIBLE PURCHASE DATES WHICH
ENABLES RECOVERY OF SHORT-SWING PROFITS
A N INSIDER1 is not liable for "short-swing" profits under Section
16 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act 2 unless, among other things,
there has been a "purchase" of securities as required by that section.
In Booth v. Varian Associates,3 the First Circuit Court of Appeals
considered the problem of defining the term "purchase" in a trans-
action where an executory contract left certain variables to be de-
termined at a future closing date. The court held that where two
possible purchase dates exist, the one which more effectively deters
the abuses intended to be eliminated by section 16 (b) will be se-
lected.
In Booth, defendant-insiders and the plaintiff-corporation en-
tered into an amended stock purchase contract on February 26,
1959, containing a provision that the price per share and number of
shares to be received by the insiders would be determined at the con-
tract closing date in accordance with a fixed formula.4 The stock was
transferred three years later on the closing date,6 and within six
I Directors, officers, and beneficial owners of 10% of any class of equity security of
the issuer are termed insiders for purposes of § 16 by the courts and commentators
as a shorthand term of art. SEcuRaIEs EXCHANE ACr oF 1934 § 16(a)-(c), 48 Stat.
896, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (a)-(c) (1958).
2"For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relation.
ship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale . . . of
any equity security of such issuer . . . within any period of less than six months,
shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on
the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction
of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period
exceeding six months. ... SECUmTIES EXCHANGE ACr OF 1934 § 16(b), 48 Stat. 896,
15 U.S.C. § 78p (b) (1958).
3 334 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1964).
4 The contract was executed pursuant to an acquisition of Bomac Laboratories, Inc.
by plaintiff-corporation. Shortly before execution, defendants assumed positions on
the board of directors of plaintiff-corporation; by the terms of the contract, defen.
dants were to deliver a specified number of Bomac shares to plaintiff on the contract
closing date, originally specified as July 2, 1962, and subject to acceleration. In
return, they were to receive that number of shares of the plaintiff's stock which would
have a market value equal to two million dollars on the day prior to the closing
date, plus 20% of the increase in retained earnings realized on the Bomac stock
during the period December 31, 1958, to the end of that month preceding the closing
date. Id. at 2.
5 By the terms of the contract, plaintiff-corporation was given the right to ac-
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months thereafter a portion of the stock acquired was sold by the
defendants. The corporation sued under section 16 (b) to recover
profits realized from the sale, and the district court ordered sum-
mary judgment for the plaintiff.6 The order was affirmed on appeal,
with the First Circuit holding that the "purchase" occurred on the
closing date rather than the contract execution date. The court
reasoned that where two possible purchase dates exist, the one more
likely to result in a violation of 16 (b) will be chosen. Since
the statute of limitations would preclude recovery for sales within
six months of the execution date, the closing date was denominated
as the purchase.7
Prior to the enactment of section 16 (b), an insider was often
able to use inside information to realize "short-swing" profits at the
expense of the public investor.8 In 1934, Congress felt elimination
of this practice was necessary to restore investor confidence in the
securities market by satisfying demands for fair market dealing.
Therefore, it adopted an arbitrary six month period within which
any profits acquired by an insider on a purchase and sale of his
corporation's equity securities may be recovered by the issuer.9
celerate the closing date of the contract at will any time prior to July 2, 1962, the
specified closing date. On the other hand, defendant-insiders were permitted to
accelerate only on their- death or legal incompetency (in which event their legal
representatives were required to exchange the stock) or on an involuntary change in
their positions as directors of either Bomac or the plaintiff. In fact, plaintiff did
accelerate the closing date of June 29, 1962. Brief for Appellant, pp. 3-5.
Ovarian Associates, Inc. v. Booth, 224 F. Supp. 225 (D. Mass. 1963).
7334 F.2d at 4-5. It was also argued by defendants that even if the closing date
were denominated as the purchase date, the transaction falls within the provision
of § 16(b) exempting stock acquired in good faith in connection with a debt pre-
viously contracted. Brief for Appellant, pp. 42-48. The court rejected this argument
by stating that the debt must exist separately from the stock transaction. The court
reasoned that to allow the § 16(b) exemption to apply in this case would permit
evasion of the act since any acquisition of stock could take the form of a contract
in which the seller would owe a debt (obligation to deliver the stock) and the buyer
would also assume a debt (obligation to pay for the stock). Id. at 5-6; see 1962 DUKE
L.J. 589.
8This would happen in transactions between the insider and an investor from
the general public who relies only on market place information. For example, suppose
an insider discovers that his corporation will probably receive an important gov-
ernment contract, and therefore promptly purchases stock of his corporation. After a
sharp rise in market value occasioned by the announcement of the contract, he
sells the stock at a profit. The insider has thereby made a profit not by reacting
to market place information, but by taking advantage of inside information not
equally available to all investors. Congress reasoned that to take profits at the
expense of one who is not in a position to acquire such knowledge is a breach of
the insider's fiduciary duty. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, 20-21 (1934);
S. REp. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55-68 (1934).
0 Congressional investigation disclosed that most of the abuses of insider privileges
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Since the act is remedial rather than punitive, it has no applica-
tion unless profits are realized by the insider.10 Moreover, in certain
situations courts have held 16 (b) inapplicable for policy reasons
even though a purchase has occurred within six months of a sale."'
Where the securities involved were privately held and had no estab-
lished market, 16 (b) was not applied.' 2 Here it was reasoned that
no disparity of knowledge exists between the insider and the public
investor where the market value of the unseasoned security is not
readily determinable. Nor has the section been applied where the
insider is forced to make the purchase or sale; in these cases re-
covery has been denied on the theory that control over the trans-
action was not voluntarily exercised by the insider, and therefore
he was not in a position to gain an advantage over the public in-
vestor through the misuse of inside information.'8 The tenor of
occur in short term speculation. Where stock is held for a longer period of time,
the market reacts to factors unforeseeable by the insider and the use of inside informa-
tion becomes less effective. On this basis, Congress enacted the six month period
of restraint imposing absolute liability for profits irrespective of the insider's motive
or intent. Therefore, the act minimizes the opportunity for abuse without discourag-
ing long term investment and trading by insiders. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 2-5, 24-25 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17, 35-36 (1934);
S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, 20-21 (1934).
1o See Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 846-47 (2d Cir. 1959).
"'The SEC rules have exempted certain transactions from application of § 16(b)
which might otherwise fall within the scope of the act. 17 C.F.R. 240.16b-S, 6 & 7
(exempting certain stock options, long-term options, and acquisitions and dispositions
pursuant to mergers or consolidations).
22 Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954); Blau
v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016 (1954).
28Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927
(1959). In this case, the insider responded to a corporate directive to redeem his
preferred stock for cash or convert it to common stock. Since the market value of
the common stock was much higher than the redemption price for the preferred,
the insider converted rather than take the loss. The court recognized that from a
practical economic standpoint the conversion was involuntary. As an involuntary
transaction, 16(b) was not applied. Although this reasoning is not technically in
accord with the statutory language which states that any profit is recoverable, it
appears that the court read into the statute a legislative intent that no application
of 16(b) is required where, by virtue of an involuntary sale, the insider had no
opportunity to gain an advantage over other shareholders through the use of inside
information. In such a situation, the statutory sanctions will not operate as a curb
against short-swing profit-taking.
While the act is not concerned with the insider's motive or intent when entering
into the transaction, as Professor Loss points out, "it does seem to be of consider-
able consequence to consider whether the circumstances were such that the defendant
could possibly have obtained an advantage over the public generally which did not
already exit." 2 Loss, SEcuTrrIEs REGULATMON 1069-70 (1961). Cf. Heli-Coil Corp. v.
Webster, 222 F. Supp. 831 (D.N.J. 1963), where it was held that since the insider
was under no compulsion to convert his corporate debentures, the transaction was
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these qualifications suggest that 16 (b) is restricted to those situa-
tions where an insider realizes profits in a transaction which affords
an opportunity to misuse inside information.
Where these policy qualifications justify the application of 16 (b),
courts have implemented the statutory prohibition to include a wide
variety of transactions.14 Situations involving stock conversions, 15
stock options, 16 stock warrants, 17 stock transfers pursuant to cor-
porate reorganization, 8 and other types of stock disposal and acquisi-
tion devices'9 have been held to be within the scope of section 16 (b)
sanctions. However, with several exceptions, the courts in these
cases have not expressly evaluated policy considerations in choosing
between two possible purchase dates; instead, they have relied ex-
clusively on traditional purchase concepts, which frequently has led
to confusion. For example, where an insider receives stock warrants,
it is necessary to determine whether a purchase occurs at the issuance
date or at the date the warrant is exercised. One decision has held
that the issuance date is the date of purchase of stock warrants on
the theory that the warrant itself is the equity security acquired.20
On the other hand, another case has held that a purchase of stock
voluntary and 16(b) applied. The court did recognize, however, that an involuntary
transaction may result in a finding that 16 (b) is not applicable.
Both Ferraiolo and Heli-Coil distinguished Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160
F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1947), on the ground that although the insider there was forced
to convert under threat of redemption at a lower price per share, the insider retained
sufficient control over the corporation so that he might have vetoed a redemption
attempt. Under this situation, the insider's transaction can realistically be termed
voluntary because he could have avoided placing himself in a forcing situation.
The Park & Tilford decision, if taken literally, requires a finding of 16(b) applica-
tion whenever a conversion occurs. For this reason, the holding has been criticized
as not considering the involuntary transaction situation. See 2 Loss, SECURITImS REGULA-
TioN 1068 (1961).
"'See generally 2 Loss, S~cuarrms REGULATION 1040-182 (1961); Cook- & Feldman,
Insider Trading Under The Securities Exchange, Act, 66 HARV. L. REv. 612 (1953);
Rubin & Feldman, Statutory Inhibitions Upon Unfair Use of Corporate Information
By Insiders, 95 U. PA. L. REv. 468 (1947); Comment, 65 HARv. L. REv. 997 (1952);
Comment, 69 YAE L.J. 868 (1960); Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 510 (1950).
"I Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761
(1947); Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 222 F. Supp. 831 (D.NJ. 1963).
2' Blau v. Allen, 163 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
" Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (dictum).
"
8 Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 132 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), remanded
on other grounds, 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956); Blau
v. Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
"Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387, 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (dictum).
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warrants will not occur until the date of election because the issu-
ance is merely an offer to sell by the corporation.21
This confusion is not diminished by the statutory definition of
purchase as "any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire." 22
Because of the variety of transactions to which the act applies, a
workable definition of the purchase requirement has been difficult
to formulate. Nevertheless, several traditional purchase tests have
been devised by the courts in attempts to apply section 16 (b): a
purchase has been held not to occur until the rights and obligations
of the insider become irrevocably fixed under the transaction; 23
where the insider's percentage of ownership does not increase as a
result of the transaction, some courts are less favorably disposed to
finding a purchase;2 4 but where an insider acquires equity securities
of a different class having a higher market value, other courts have
held a purchase occurs without regard to the percentage of owner-
ship test.25
The First Circuit in Booth, however, rejected the precedential
value of early 16 (b) cases because they involve "problems
peculiar to their own types of transactions." 26 In so doing, the court
21 Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949). The
court reasoned that the issuance of a warrant was not a purchase because it was
analogous to a distribution of stock dividends. Therefore, since the defendant had
sold warrants instead of exercising his privilege to convert them to stock, 16(b) was
not applied because the sale was not preceded by a purchase within the statutory
period. The result of the Shaw decision has been criticized as permitting evasion of
the act, because it allows the insider to dispose of stock rights profitably within six
months after acquisition and yet not be penalized for using inside information. See
2 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1077 (1961); Comment, 65 HARV. L. REv. 997, 1007
(1952). But see Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 510, 521 (1950), noting that control of the
issuance by the insider may be determinative of his liability.
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, § 3 (a) (13), 48 Stat. 884, 15 U.S.C. § 78c (a) (13)
(1958).
22 Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1954). "It matters not to the speculator
who has title or possession or who can vote the stock or receive dividends. What
he needs is firm assurance that a fixed quantity can be acquired or disposed of at
a fixed price; and his commitments are on that basis." Id. at 427; see Stella v.
Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 132 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), remanded on other
grounds, 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956), holding that no
purchase occurred in a stock transfer pursuant to a corporate reorganization, where
rights and obligations did not arise until purchaser obtained a guarantee of credit to
finance the transfer. For cases which provide an inarticulated application of this
test, see cases cited notes 20-21 supra.
24 See Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 859 U.S.
927 (1959); Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954).
25 See Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 761 (1947) (conversion of preferred stock to common stock); Blau v. Hodgkinson,
100 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
2G 334 F.2d at 3.
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also refused to evaluate the transaction exclusively in terms of tradi-
tional purchase tests.27 Instead, it recognized that if a date may be
denominated a purchase under one of these tests, policy factors are
significant in focusing attention on whether a "purchase" on that
date will result in the abuse which the statute seeks to eliminate.82
Thus, this approach first ascertains whether an alleged transaction
contains the traditional attributes of purchase, and then determines
whether the legislative purpose reflected in 16 (b) warrants applica-
tion of the statute to the particular transaction. In addition, where
more than one plausible purchase date exists, the same approach is
adopted with respect to each date, and the two dates are compared to
determine which is most likely to perpetrate abuses susceptible to re-
covery under the act.2 9
Choice of the closing date in Booth as a purchase appears cor-
rect under this analysis. Traditional attributes of a purchase were
present at the closing date: 30 rights and obligations of the insiders
under the contract did not become fixed until the price per share
and number of shares to be traded were determinable;31 moreover,
physical acquisition and control over the stock did not occur until
the closing date. Assuming, therefore, that the closing date can be
27 For cases dealing with the traditional purchase inquiry see, e.g., Blau v. Ogsbury,
210 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1954) (stock option); Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp.,
132 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), remanded on other grounds, 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956) (stock transfer pursuant to corporate reorganization).
An attempt by the courts to consider only the narrow issue of when a purchase
occurs in determining the insider's liability tends to result in artificial distinctions
between cases. 'For example, the test which defines the purchase date as that time
when the rights and obligations of the insider become irrevocably fixed is undesirable
when considered alone. To comply with such a test, the insider must define the
elusive concepts of rights and obligations as well as make a difficult determination as
to when these elusive factors become relatively certain. For example, the selection
of a purchase date in Blau v. Ogsbury, supra, was based solely on an analysis of
rights and obligations without regard to which dates would afford a practical oppor-
tunity for misuse of inside information.
28 Accord, Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 344-45 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 927 (1959); Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 222 F. Supp. 831, 835 (D.N.J. 1963).
See generally 2 Loss, SEctu.urs REGULATION 1069-70 (1961).
2) 334 F.2d at 5.
0 See note 23 supra.
11 The fixed rights and obligations test appears more applicable to the situation
presented in the Booth case than does an inquiry into whether the transaction re-
sulted in an increase in defendants' percentage of ownership in the corporation. As
a result of the transaction, the defendants' ownership in the corporation increased,
but the question of when this increase occurred remains unanswered. The fixed rights
and obligations test permits the court to determine when the increase occurred by
ascertaining when the insiders' rights and obligations became sufficiently fixed to
result in a purchase.
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denominated a purchase, the policy of the act warrants application
of 16 (b) to such an acquisition of securities. Since the defendants
were voluntarily able to select a date of sale within six months of
the closing date,32 and were able to deal with securities which were
well seasoned and publicly held, 3 it appears that they could have
enjoyed an advantage over the public investor through the use of
inside information.
It should be noted, however, that there also were factors in
Booth which militate for the choice of the contract execution date.
The most persuasive of these is the statute itself, which defines
purchase as "any contract to ... acquire.' ' 34 Other traditional attri-
butes of a purchase were clearly present: both the insiders and the
corporation were firmly committed to transfer stock in accordance
with a fixed formula established at the execution date; moreover,
the insiders' percentage of ownership increased at that date", be-
cause they were assured of at least two million dollars of equity
securities in the corporation. Assuming that a sale might occur
within six months of the execution date, the policy of the statute
would also support application of 16 (b) since the insiders might
82 See Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 222 F. Supp. 831' (D.N.J. 1963).
Section 16(b) applies to any six month period where a purchase is preceded or
followed by a sale. It has been held that where the second of the two transactions
is involuntary, 16(b) will not apply. Id. at 835. On the other hand, in Ferraiolo v.
Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959), it was held
that 16(b) did not apply where the first traniction is involuntary. Thus, it might
be argued in Booth that since plaintiff enjoyed exclusive control over the determina-
tion of the closing date through the use of its acceleration privilege (see note 5
supra), the first transaction was involuntary and, therefore, the act should not apply.
Assuming arguendo that the purchase was involuntary, this approach nevertheless
seems to overlook the fact that profit taking is dependent upon a voluntary act of the
insiders in selecting the subsequent date of sale. Ferraiolo, therefore, seems incon-
sistent with the basic philosophy of 16 (b).
Furthermore, it might be argued that if the second transaction is involuntary,
the act should still apply if there exists an opportunity for taking profits by the
use of inside information. For example, if the defendants sold their rights under
the contract within six months prior to an involuntarily fixed closing date, which
was announced prior to defendants' decision to sell, their knowledge of inside informa-
tion may have enabled them to predict a market decrease prior to the announced
closing date.
8 8 Plaintiff's stock was listed on the New York Stock Exchange since late 1959. 334
F.2d at 3. For cases which hold 16(b) to be inapplicable where the security involved
neither is well seasoned nor has an established market, see note 12 supra.
3, See statute cited note 22 sutpra.
25 For cases applying the increase in percentage of ownership test, see note 24 supra.
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have obtained an advantage over the public investor through the
use of inside information.36
Comparison of the two plausible purchase dates, however, com-
pels the conclusion that as a practical matter, choice of the later
date would better effectuate the prevention of short-swing profits.
Since the formula in the executory contract contained certain vari-
ables, the existence and amount of profits on any sale were not
determinable until the value per share was ascertained at the closing
date. Accordingly, the First Circuit reasoned that a "sale" within
six months of the execution date could not result in an enforceable
violation of the statute because profits, an essential element of re-
covery, could not have been determined until after the two year
statute of limitations expired. 37 Furthermore, where the price per
share and number of shares to be traded remains uncertain, it would
seem impossible for the insider to speculate with the stock during a
period prior to the six months before the closing date.3 As a practi-
85For example, defendants might have been able to voluntarily assign a portion
of their rights under the contract within six months after the execution date. They
were assured of receiving at least two million dollars worth of securities under the
executory contract. See note 4 supra.
However, it is not clear from the facts of the case whether the securities were
seasoned at this time. The reported case merely states that the plaintiff's stock had
been listed on the New York Stock Exchange since late 1959. It would seem that
if no established market existed at the execution date or within six months there-
after, no disparity of knowledge would exist between the insiders and the public
investor and, therefore, no policy requirement for application of 16(b) would exist.
11 The statute of limitations provision of the act states that "no . . . suit shall be
brought more than two years after such profit was realized." The Booth court
assumed that the statute would start to run at any sale date which occurred within
six months of the execution date. While this is the normal assumption because
profits are usually determined and actually acquired at a sale date, Booth arguably
is a case where the assumption would not apply. Whether profits will be realized
from a 1959 sale is pure speculation until the price per share is determined at the
closing date. Since ascertainment of any profits is postponed until this date, the
realization of profits required to start the limitations period running would not occur
until the closing date. It is arguable, therefore, that an enforceable violation would
result if either the execution date or the dosing date were denominated as a purchase.
The Booth court apparently rejected the defendants' argument that if the statute
began running at the 1959 sale, plaintiff could bring the action within the two year
limitation period, ask the court to determine if there had been a 16 (b) violation,
and if it so determined, further request that judgment be postponed until profits,
if any, could be determined. Brief for Appellant, p. 27.
"1 Indeed, the motive for speculation was nonexistent as the defendants were in-
sulated from market fluctuation prior to the closing date. The aggregate value of
securities to be received on that date was fixed by factors unrelated to the market.
See note 4 supra. Accordingly, the defendants could not sustain a loss on a sale
at market price if they waited until the closing date to sell.
Disposal of these shares at any time prior to acquisition at the dosing date
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cal matter, therefore, the opportunity for misuse of inside informa-
tion would not be worth pursuing until the closing date.30 Thus,
the Booth court recognized that since the policy of 16 (b) is to deter
potential abuses, that date which presents the greatest likelihood for
abuse is the preferrable choice for the date of purchase.40
By looking to policy considerations, Booth reflects a recent
trend deviating from the confusion of prior decisions which relied
exclusively on traditional concepts of purchase ascertainment. At
the same time it permits consistent application of the act and there-
by renders less forceful the argument that 16 (b) is a trap for the
unwary.41
Nevertheless, the Booth assumption that only one of two plausi-
ble purchase dates may be selected 42 falls short of the desired statu-
tory policy of eliminating any short-swing profit resulting from the
might be denominated a short sale prohibited by § 16 (c) (1). SEcuuTms EXCHANGE Aar
OF 1934, § 16 (c) (1), 48 Stat. 897, 15 U.S.C. § 7 8p (c) (1) (1958). Therefore, it is possible
that the insiders would be precluded as a matter of law from speculating with this
stock before the dosing date. This would constitute a cogent reason for a court to
postpone the purchase date to the dosing date.B' Defendants did not report their acquisitions under § 16 (a) of the act until June
1962. Brief for Appellant, p. 28, n.6. This adds weight to the contention that the
transaction was not a "purchase" until that time.
Conceivably, the defendants could have sold their rights to the stock immediately
prior to the dosing date with the ability to reasonably predict the dosing price per
share. Market fluctuation, however, would detract from this ability as such a sale
moved away in time from the dosing date. Thus, a sale more than six months prior to
the dosing date would be extremely speculative and, as a practical matter, the use
of inside information on the sale date would be of little consequence.
40 See Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert denied, 359 U.S.
927 (1959), where the court stated, "Every transaction which can reasonably be de-
fined as a purchase will be so defined, if the transaction is of a kind which can possi-
bly lend itself to the speculation encompassed by Section 16 (b)." 259 F.2d at 343.
"For a discussion of criticisms of § 16 (b), see 2 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1087-
90 (1961).
42 The courts have apparently never expressly held that more than one purchase
date may be possible in a single transaction, but such a result may be implied from
the language of several cases. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943); Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387, 390-91
(S.D.N.Y. 1948); see 2 Loss, SEcUItmS REGULATION 1076-79 (1961). Although purchase
traditionally implies that title to an article can pass only once, if the purpose of the
statute is "to squeeze all possible profits out of stock transactions, and thus to estab-
lish a standard so high as to prevent any conflict between the selfish interest of a
fiduciary officer, director or stockholder and the faithful performance of his duty"
(Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., supra at 239), the traditional requirements of purchase
should be discarded in favor of a more liberal interpretation of the statute. Even
if technical purchase concepts are to be controlling, however, it is arguable that at
each of several plausible purchase dates, the insider acquires a portion of the rights
in the equity security, and a purchase and sale of any portion of these rights within
a six month period permits application of 16 (b) sanctions.
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abuse of inside information. The statute does not limit the court
to a choice of only one purchase date in any transaction;' thus it
would seem that any date occurring within six months of a sale
which offers the likelihood of potential abuse should be denomi-
nated a purchase if it satisfies traditional purchase concepts. Any-
thing less offers opportunity for evasion of the act. For example,
if the insiders in Booth could have sold a portion of their rights to
the securities within six months after executing the contract, and sold
the remainder of the acquired stock within six months of the closing
date, under a literal reading of Booth only one of the two dates could
be denominated a purchase. This would allow profits realized on a
sale within six months of the other date to be retained by the insider
in contravention of the statute's policy. To denominate both dates
as purchase dates, thereby allowing recovery of profits realized from
a sale within six months of either date, would effectuate the statu-
tory policy of eliminating all potential abuses.
